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Abstract 
 
 This thesis argues that the left wing in Germany is primed to form a 
governing coalition in Germany following ten years of center-right rule. 
Thuringia is the case study within this paper because of the unique position of 
the Left Party in that state that is different from its place in any other part of 
Germany. The Left Party in the state of Thuringia is the senior partner in a 
coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Alliance90/the Greens, the 
first time the Left Party has led a state government in the Federal Republic. This 
also unites all three left of center parties.  
This thesis looks at the current government in Germany and the left-
wing’s reaction to ten years of center-right power. In order to do so, I look at the 
potential impact of a left-wing government on the state level on political taboos 
in Germany and the ways that the SPD and Greens have reacted to current 
issues in German politics. The SPD and the Greens are also both experiencing 
a change in their electoral fates. These parties are more successful on the local 
and state levels than nationally at present, but this could change as the Left 
Party and the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) forces changes in the 
political landscape. Amid media claims that Angela Merkel and her governing 
coalition are vulnerable due to their approach to the refugee crisis, which has 
been unpopular among many Germans, I argue that a left-wing coalition could 
be the answer in the future.  
 The Left Party’s power in Thuringia is vital to the future of the Left Party, 
as it shows that that party is able to govern fairly and in a democratic system 
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and may help to repair this party’s image nationwide. The left wing represents 
an important alternative to right-wing populism in Europe. This is important for 
the future because Germany is a leader in the European Union. As seen with 
the refugee crisis and rise of far right populism, when things change in 
Germany, consequences may be felt throughout Europe. 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
 After surviving the Euro crisis and global economic downturn of the early 
2010s, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany looked unstoppable. 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition government was very popular, and 
Germany’s place as leader of Europe was secure. However, this changed 
following the influx of refugees into Germany over the course of 2015 and the 
change in the German political landscape. These changes saw a new right-wing 
party become popular as well as a reemergence of difficulties within the CDU’s 
alliance with the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU).  This thesis looks at 
the current government within Germany to determine the ways that the ruling 
coalition may be vulnerable and answer the research question: How has the left 
wing responded to contemporary issues in German politics? I argue that the 
German Left has the potential to form a ruling coalition due to its recent political 
stances, but must overcome some significant difficulties in order to do so. The 
unique role that the Left Party is playing the state of Thuringia despite the long-
standing taboo against that party further supports this argument. To make this 
point, I use theory on left-wing politics, which claims that competition on the left 
is a favorable electoral condition for left-wing parties.1 Other theory states that 
newer parties change more easily than established ones, so newer parties such 
as the Left Party are more likely to change their policies than older parties such 
                                                 
1
 Christopher J. Anderson and Pablo Beramendi, “Left Parties, Poor Voters, and Electoral 
Participation in Advanced Industrial Societies,” Comparative Political Studies 45(2012): 715. 
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as the CDU or Social Democratic Party (SPD).2 Therefore, newer parties could 
change policies more easily in order to become more palatable in the current 
political environment, which has made the far right more attractive to some 
voters. 
 The taboos in German politics constrain all parties. A formal taboo exists 
against neo-Nazism in Germany; to promote National Socialism is outlawed 
under Section 86 of the German Criminal Code.3 This has bled over into a 
social taboo against working together with far right parties, even if they operate 
within the law. On the left, a similar social taboo exists concerning the Left Party 
because it is the successor to the East German Social Unity Party (SED).4 Both 
of these taboos exist due to ideologies that have spawned dictatorships in 
Germany in the past. However, this taboo has become less and less relevant 
on the left as the Left Party has emerged from its isolation after significant 
internal reforms. The popularity of the Left Party and the far-right Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) has the potential to upend the political balance in Germany in 
the near future. 
 The taboos in German politics are related to larger taboos within 
European politics. Parties such as the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) have 
also experienced recent popularity despite their pariah status among the 
                                                 
2
 Russell J. Dalton and Ian McAllister, “Random Walk or Planned Excursion? Continuity and 
Change in the Left-Right Positions of Political Parties,” Comparative Political Studies 48(2015): 
763. 
3
 “Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB),” German Law Archive, accessed June 4, 2016, 
http://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=752#86. 
4
 Gerhard Spörl, “Der alte Schwefelgeruch,” Der Speigel, December 1, 2014, 
https://magazin.spiegel.de/digital/?utm_source=spon&utm_campaign=centerpage#SP/2014/49/
130630554. 
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political elite.5 The FPÖ’s Norbert Hofer came extraordinarily close to being 
elected president of Austria, which shows large-scale dissatisfaction and 
disillusionment with the mainstream party system.6 Other countries, including 
the United Kingdom, Greece, Poland, and France, have also seen similar 
reactions to the political status quo.7 Poland’s leadership is increasingly 
autocratic.8 The French National Front saw electoral gains following terrorist 
attacks.9 Germany is but one example among many of how right-wing populism 
has become popular despite its taboo in contemporary Europe. 
 To research and write this multidisciplinary thesis, I relied on articles 
from popular news sources in both English and German as well as academic 
articles about the history of German political parties and political party theory. I 
also used economics to look at the current state of Germany as a whole. 
Statistical analysis was helpful in building charts and analyzing voter 
demographic information. 
The first chapter looks at the current political situation in Germany under 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU/SPD coalition, including the current 
composition of state governments and the results of the state elections in the 
first quarter of 2016. The current situation is important in the long term as left-
                                                 
5
  Benjamin Cunningham, “Austrian Answers,” The Slovak Spectator, May 27, 2016, 
http://spectator.sme.sk/c/20174498/austrian-answers.html. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Tim Wigmore, “Why are right wing parties thriving across Europe?,” New Statesman, October 
8, 2015, http://www.newstatesman.com/culture/observations/2015/10/why-are-right-wing-
parties-thriving-across-europe. 
8
 Jan Puhl, “A Polish Putin: Autocratic Power Grab Accelerates in Warsaw,” Der Spiegel, March 
30, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/poland-government-tightens-grip-on-
power-a-1084499.html. 
9
 Adam Chandler, “Le Pen Will Be Mightier,” The Atlantic, December 14, 2015, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/marine-le-pen-front-national-
france/420348/. 
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wing parties’ reactions to current politics will dictate future voter opinion. The 
AfD has already impacted the politics of the CDU and its often strained 
relationship with the CSU in its attempt to pull German politics further to the 
right.  
The second chapter looks at the current politics of the SPD and 
Alliance90/the Greens (the Greens). The two parties share views on many left-
wing issues like climate change and education, but current topics such as the 
refugee crisis demonstrate the continuing differences between the two. The 
SPD’s place in German politics, although never far from power, is currently 
experiencing a crisis due to the left-leaning policy choices the CDU has been 
making. The CDU has become left of center on several issues by accepting 
refugees and working to eliminate nuclear energy, which I argue makes it 
difficult for the SPD to carve out a unique space for itself in German politics 
because of competition both to the ideological right and left. 
The final chapter analyzes the left-wing coalition government in the 
German state of Thuringia. The Left Party in the state of Thuringia is the senior 
partner in a coalition with the SPD and the Greens, which is historic because it 
is the first time the Left Party has led a state government in the Federal 
Republic. This also unites all three left of center parties. Thuringia is the case 
study within this paper because the Left Party is the senior coalition partner. 
The taboo surrounding the Left Party in German politics due to its past as the 
East German party-state is another reason why this government is important for 
contemporary analysis. This party has overcome its past to be begrudgingly 
5 
 
accepted into the circle of standard political parties in Germany. Every party 
must start somewhere, and the Left Party’s place in the background over the 
past twenty-five years shows that this is not just a flash of populism which other 
parties such as the AfD are experiencing currently. On the contrary, the Left 
Party is slowly paying its dues to the political establishment even as the party 
retains some of its left-wing populist roots.  
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Chapter 1: Angela Merkel’s Germany 
 After ten years of leadership by Germany’s center right party, the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), doubts are emerging among the public 
about the effectiveness of this government and especially about Chancellor 
Angela Merkel’s leadership. The vulnerability that Merkel and the CDU are 
facing is defined as the likelihood of the CDU losing substantial amounts of 
support among the German people. This loss of support could result in a non-
CDU federal government being formed. Vulnerability also includes the 
significant divide that is reemerging between the CDU and the CSU.  The 
critiques of Merkel and the perceived vulnerability of her party’s place are 
exacerbated by strife within the CDU and the ruling “Grand Coalition” between 
the CDU and Social Democratic Party (SPD). This situation has been seized 
upon by the press and has the potential to cause the CDU to lose power in 
Germany in the upcoming federal elections of 2017.  
Some analysts have already begun to imagine alternatives to this 
government with left- and right-coalitions, given the rise of those further to the 
right of the CDU as well as the role of the Left Party on the state level. Out of 
those to the right of the CDU, the populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) is the 
major new player in German politics. This party has experienced rapid growth 
over its short history, although it suffers from the taboo that the CDU has 
against working with those further to the right. The idea of the taboo in German 
politics has constrained the possible coalitions thus far; however, there is 
always the potential for these taboos to be broken, especially on the left. 
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Although Merkel’s government is not as vulnerable as the media make it appear 
to be, a left-wing coalition could still capitalize upon the changes in German 
politics in order to gain more votes. 
History of the CDU 
The German Christian Democratic Party has its roots in the postwar 
European Christian Democratic movement.10 This movement is important to 
understand because of its overall stability over the history of the Federal 
Republic, which makes any vulnerability even more significant than if the CDU 
were a new player in German politics. Many parties, including the CDU, were 
founded immediately following World War II in order to preserve conservative 
Christian values. The CDU also functioned as a more moderate conservative 
party as the far right was a pariah that was legally outlawed from existing in 
Germany, which served to fuel a taboo against working with far right parties that 
are not outright prohibited.11  
The CDU’s Bavarian sister party, the CSU, was founded by like-minded 
Bavarians during this time due to special regional issues in the large southern 
state of Bavaria.12 The two parties began to work together in 1947 in a 
cooperation that continues today, although the two parties often disagree on 
issues that are of special interest to Bavarians.13 This is in part due to Bavaria’s 
wealth, especially in comparison to the new federal states that were once part 
                                                 
10
 “1945-1949: Gründungsphase der CDU,” Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, accessed January 21, 
2016, http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.8753/. 
11
 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 80. 
12
 “Die 1940er,” CSU, accessed January 16, 2016, http://www.csu.de/partei/geschichte/die-
1940er/. 
13
 “1945-1949: Gründungsphase,” Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 
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of East Germany, which results in very different priorities. The CSU and CDU 
have traditionally had some conflict, which is why the two parties have different 
leadership and never formed one unified party. In 1976, the CSU under Franz 
Josef Strauβ ended the partnership between the two parties until Helmut Kohl’s 
CDU began to make plans to campaign in Bavaria, which threatened the CSU’s 
regional power and motivated the party to reenter the union.14 This means that 
today’s Merkel/Horst Seehofer feud can be read as just another chapter in a 
long-running rivalry. The CDU/CSU disputes are an ordinary party of both 
parties’ identities. On the federal level today, the CDU and CSU seats are both 
part of the CDU bloc. Despite the traditional closeness that the two parties 
share, in recent months the CSU has begun to operate more independently of 
the CDU, which shows an important vulnerability within the German center 
right. 
 The coalitions that the CDU has built have involved parties that are both 
liberal and conservative. Their long-time liberal partners, the Free Democratic 
Party (FDP), have recently suffered a drop in poll numbers; as a result they 
presently have no seats in the German Bundestag.15 The party was therefore 
forced to ally with the SPD since their center-right partners were no longer an 
                                                 
14
 “Kalender: 19. November 1976,” Konrad-Adenauder-Stiftung, accessed April 8, 2016, 
http://www.kas.de/wf/de/191.502/. 
15
 “Endgültiges Ergebnis der Bundestagwahl 2013,” Der Bundeswahlleiter, accessed January 
21, 2016, 
https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_13/ergebnisse/bundeserg
ebnisse/index.html. 
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option. Since 2013, the CDU is the only nominally conservative party in the 
Bundestag; the other three parliamentary parties are all left of center.16 
Analysis of Previous Elections 
 Using information from previous election results, electoral issues, and 
political party theory can help to understand the political situation that allowed 
the CDU to be so successful in the past. Government changes in Germany 
would have an impact on European politics, which could also impact German-
American and EU-American relations. This information can also help to 
determine the conditions under which the CDU won a majority on the federal 
level, which can also help to inform views on the stability of the current 
government. 
 One important topic of note in previous elections that may be changing in 
the future is the political taboo among German political parties. The taboos are, 
with one exception, extralegal social barriers to working with certain parties due 
to their history or policy positions. The exception to this is the legal barrier to 
promoting National Socialism, with which the National Democratic Party (NPD) 
is currently battling.17 The political taboo largely affects fringe parties without 
electoral power, although two large parties on the left and right are also harmed 
by this taboo. The Left Party faces considerable opposition from the CDU and 
SPD as it is the successor party to the East German Social Unity Party. 
Although the SPD has allowed its local and state branches to decide 
                                                 
16
 “Deutscher Bundestag – Fraktionen,” Deutscher Bundestag, accessed January 21, 2016, 
http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/fraktionen. 
17
 “Germany’s top court mulls banning extreme NPD,” Deutsche Welle, March 1, 2016, 
http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-top-court-mulls-banning-extremist-npd/a-19083756. 
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individually whether or not to work with the Left Party, the national branch has 
not worked with the Left Party to date, despite statements that claim the party is 
open to ending this taboo.18 The AfD, on the other hand, faces a taboo from 
every other parliamentary party due to their extreme right-wing positions on the 
European Union and the refugee crisis. This taboo has forced unlikely coalitions 
on the state level, such as Saxony-Anhalt’s CDU/SPD/Greens compromise, 
because the AfD is popular among the people even if it is not popular among 
Germany’s party elite.19   
 The last federal election in Germany took place on September 22, 2013. 
Since this election took place before the refugee crisis began, there are limits to 
how much it can inform us concerning current voter attitudes. However, the 
demographic information about these voters can be helpful to a certain extent in 
determining the potential electorate for the next elections, especially when 
combined with more contemporary polls of voter sentiment. 
 The continuing East-West difference in voting trends is one of the 
biggest takeaways from the most recent federal voting data when one looks at 
the second vote. The first vote in this election was for a candidate for 
Chancellor; the second was a vote for a political party. Since the popularity of 
Chancellor Merkel resulted in many non-CDU members casting their first vote 
for her, the party voter data is of more use in this case. The population of 
                                                 
18
 Severin Weiland, “Koalitionsfrage 2017: Gabriels gewagter Coup,” Der Spiegel, November 
12, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/kommentar-spd-koalition-mit-der-linken-soll-
kein-tabu-mehr-sein-a-933203.html. 
19
 Jacob Alexander, “Coalition government in Saxony-Anhalt to exclude AfD,” Deutsche Welle, 
April 19, 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/coalition-government-in-saxony-anhalt-to-exclude-afd/a-
19199791. 
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eastern Germany remains much smaller than that of the western part of the 
country, with 28,575,572 fewer voters in 2013.20 Therefore, the region’s much 
larger support for the Left Party (22.7% as opposed to 5.6% in western 
Germany) is less influential on the national stage.21 
 The CDU is popular in all areas of the country. The party, along with the 
CSU, received 41.5% of the overall vote, although this support was slightly 
weaker in the East than in the West.22 However, Merkel was popular across 
several parties; the majority of CDU, FDP, and AfD supporters believed she 
would be the best choice for chancellor. Surprisingly, 43% of Left Party 
supporters found Merkel a better choice than the SPD candidate, Peer 
Steinbrück. However, the majority of Left Party members voted for the Left 
Party candidate, Gregor Gysi, even though his odds of winning were slim.23  
Previous Electoral Issues 
 The election of 2013 had different issues at the forefront than an election 
held today would. The Left Party campaigned on a platform aimed at reforming 
the “discriminatory Hartz IV” welfare laws and expanded educational 
opportunities for the young, as well as hanging signs that said “The East Votes 
Red. Understand?”24 The Hartz welfare reform laws cut benefits for the 
                                                 
20
 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V., Bundestagswahl: Eine Analyse der Wahl vom 22. 
September 2013 (Mannheim: Institut für Wahlanalysen und Gesellschaftsbeobachtung, 2013), 
9. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V., Bundestagswahl, 25. 
24
 Gregor Gysi, 100% Sozial: Wahlzeiting zur Bundestagswahl am 22. September 2013, Die 
Linke, [2013], 2. 
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unemployed and are extremely unpopular in Germany.25 This is important 
because the SPD was the senior partner in the ruling coalition that passed the 
Hartz IV welfare laws, making an attack against them an attack against the 
SPD. The SPD and CDU both campaigned on more complex platforms; both 
parties focused on social domestic issues, such as education and finance.26 To 
the right of center, electoral strategies took a more nationalistic form, with the 
NPD and AfD both campaigning against the European Union and migration into 
Germany.27 Finally, the FDP, which could be seen as the big loser in this 
election as they lost their parliamentary status, campaigned on a platform of job 
creation as well as a promise to work against higher taxes.28 The takeaway 
from electoral promises made in 2013 is that migration had already become an 
issue for members of the AfD and neo-Nazi NPD, but it had not yet become a 
mainstream issue. Domestic issues clearly trumped concerns over European 
integration and non-ethnic German influence on German society for the majority 
of voters. 
Recent Polls 
 The aforementioned migration and refugee issues have become a large 
political issue in Germany. A poll taken by German state broadcaster ARD in 
February 2016 shows that 81% of Germans believe that the federal government 
                                                 
25
 Ben Knight, “The much-hated Hartz IV,” Deutsche Welle, February 9, 2010, 
http://www.dw.com/en/the-much-hated-hartz-iv/a-5221558. 
26
 Das WIR entscheidet. Kurz und Klar: Was wir wollen, SPD-Parteivorstand, [2013], 4. 
27
 “Werden die zu stark, wirst du zu schwach,” NPD Landesverband Thüringen, Eisenach, 
[2013].  
28
 “Nur mit uns,” FDP-Erfurt, Erfurt, [2013]. 
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does not have the refugee situation under control.29 The approval rating for the 
federal government has dropped 19 percentage points from 57% in July 2015 to 
38% in February 2016.30 The final evidence of public dissatisfaction with the 
current political situation comes from the results of the party poll. February poll 
results suggested that the Euroskeptic AfD would win 12% of the vote, 
becoming the third strongest party in the Bundestag.31  By June 2016, the poll 
numbers showed the AfD within four percentage points of the SPD in 
popularity.32 If the NPD becomes an outlawed party under German law, this 
percentage could grow a bit higher as NPD voters are likely to turn to the AfD 
as the next best conservative option, as evidenced by a recent campaign 
encouraging NPD voters to vote AfD.33 This shows an initiative by the NPD to 
circumvent the actual taboo concerning the far right in German law. The 
likelihood of the AfD being accepted as a coalition partner by any of the other 
parties, however, remains doubtful due to the social taboo still associated with 
the far right. 
                                                 
29
 Ellen Ehni, “AfD würde drittstärkste Kraft,” ARD, February 3, 2016,   
http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend-475.html. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Dietmar Neuerer, “SPD-Linke trommeln für Linksbündnis,” Handelsblatt, June 1, 2016, 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/bundestagswahl-2017-spd-linke-trommeln-fuer-
linksbuendnis/13667082.html. 
33
 Tilman Steffen, “NPD dient sich der AfD an,” Zeit Online, March 7, 2016, 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-03/landtagswahlen-npd-afd-allianz-koalition-
erststimme. 
14 
 
 
Source: Markus Feldenkirchen and René Pfister, “Egal wie es ausgeht…,” Der Spiegel, January 
23, 2016, 14-15. 
 
Paths to Left-Wing Power 
 Although the current ruling coalition in Germany is a Grand Coalition 
between the SPD and CDU, this is not an optimal configuration for either party. 
Especially since the refugee crisis has soured, there has been tension between 
the two parties within the coalition; both would rather be the senior leader in a 
coalition with another party that would make for a less even split of power. 
Given that the CDU still remains popular relative to other German parties, even 
with the current disapproval of their actions, it could be difficult for the SPD to 
form a governing coalition on the federal level. However, this is not an 
impossible task; this has happened as recently as 1998-2004, when the SPD 
and Greens formed a governing coalition in Germany.34 
Theory 
                                                 
34
 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, e.V., Bundestagswahl, 72. 
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 The literature on coalition formation and voting for left-wing parties 
indicates that certain types of voters are more likely to vote for a left-wing party 
under certain conditions. Germany’s hybrid system, which combines a nominal 
and proportional system of voting, also contributes to voter turnout and voter 
strategy.35 Since voters are allowed to vote for a candidate and a party 
separately, the two may not always come from the same party. Additionally, the 
mandate system means that the total number of seats, and therefore the 
number of seats needed for a majority, can shift from election to election. Since 
reunification, the total number of seats has fluctuated between 603 and 672.36 
 Left-wing parties are typically more likely to win low-income voters in 
conditions of competition on the left.37 This means that the three left-wing 
parties in Germany could win more votes due to their competition. However, 
this also means that the parties could split the votes for Chancellor, which could 
work to the CDU’s benefit since the right is more unified electorally. The hybrid 
system means that theories and strategies that apply to one system of voting do 
not necessarily apply to the other.  
 Additionally, the theory posits that the politics of a newer party are more 
easily changed than that of an established party such as the CDU or SPD.38 
The Greens and the Left Party are more likely to change their positions 
because they do not have as large of an established party base. This could 
                                                 
35
 Audrey Andre, Sam Depauw, and Shane Martin, “Electoral Systems and Legislators’ 
Constituency Effort: The Mediating Effect of Electoral Vulnerability,” Comparative Political 
Studies 48(2015): 473. 
36
 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V., Bundestagswahl, 70. 
37
 Anderson and Beramendi, “Left Parties, Poor Voters, and Electoral Participation in Advanced 
Industrial Societies,” 715. 
38
 Dalton and McAllister, “Random Walk or Planned Excursion? Continuity and Change in the 
Left-Right Positions of Political Parties,” 772. 
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have implications for a potential SPD/Left Party/Green government since the 
SPD has established itself as being against the Left Party due to that party’s 
past. However, this theory does not guarantee inflexibility over time. 
 The idea of a minimal winning coalition also helps to explain some 
partnerships. This theory states that a party will look to form a government with 
the minimum number of parties possible to form a majority.39 Additionally, a 
party with a relatively large percentage of the vote will work with a smaller party 
over a larger party in order to retain more power for itself. Minimal connected 
winning coalition theory takes this idea a step further to postulate that a party 
will work with an ideologically similar party out of all the options that comply with 
minimal winning coalition theory.40 
Contemporary Discussion of Merkel’s Leadership 
Refugee Crisis 
 Contemporary discussion of German policy in the press has been 
focused on a few areas. The refugee crisis, terrorism, and the economy have 
dominated discussion, with implications for state governments and the federal 
coalition. The refugee crisis is of extraordinary importance in German politics 
today. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are currently living all over Germany, 
in conditions ranging from homes to temporary living quarters set up in an 
abandoned airport. As this crisis stretches on with no end in sight, many have 
come to doubt Chancellor Merkel’s assertion that “wir schaffen das” (“we can do 
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it”). A few specific instances of crime by refugees have helped to fuel a 
reactionary movement against refugees in Germany.41 
 Both the German government and the German people’s original reaction 
to the large number of refugees from the Middle East was to welcome them with 
open arms. Although there were always those on the fringe who did not want 
these people to live in their country, this view was originally limited to those on 
the far right, who launched attacks against refugee homes and were extremely 
outspoken on the internet.42 Groups such as Pegida (Patriotic Europeans 
against the Islamization of the West) and their imitators were central to this 
movement, which was originally only embraced by a minority. However, 
Germany’s open approach to refugee management was already starting to 
change by New Year’s Eve 2015. 
 Germany was rocked by a series of attacks by those alleged to be 
refugees on New Year’s Eve in several German cities, most notably Cologne. 
Large groups, mostly composed of men, surrounded the main train station in 
Cologne and attacked those who tried to enter the building.43 These attacks 
raised questions about the refugee vetting process as well as the integration of 
refugees into German life. Following these attacks, 60 percent of Germans said 
that they doubted that their country could absorb the new refugee population.44 
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This marks the first time that the majority of those polled voiced doubts about 
the likelihood of the refugees becoming integrated into German society. This 
polling was accompanied by attacks from the right, including the Alternative for 
Germany (AfD), who called for Merkel to resign over the issue.45 CSU leader 
Seehofer went even further by referring to Merkel’s policies as “unjust,” a word 
that is not often used outside of describing situations such as the East German 
dictatorship.46 
 The media has focused on Merkel’s response to the refugee crisis over 
all other issues since mid-2015. Der Spiegel posited that this was the first time 
that Merkel was truly fighting for her beliefs instead of “merkeling” her way to a 
decision, saying that “now the German people will meet the real Angela 
Merkel.”47 Merkel herself points to the refugee crisis as an example of people in 
need that a Christian party cannot ignore, although others in her party do not 
agree with this philosophy.48 This rift, from the beginning of the refugee crisis 
seen between Merkel and finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, has since 
extended to other members of the party including many members of the CSU 
as the old rivalry between the two center-right parties has flared up yet again.  
 The reliance of the successful refugee policy on the cooperation of other 
EU countries as well as Turkey is another controversial subject in the press. 
Negative views of this policy, especially concerning Turkey and its leader 
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Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, are common among conservative publications.49 The 
Frankfurter Allgemeine points out that Merkel cannot successfully implement 
her policy while relying on undemocratic leaders such as Erdoğan and the belief 
that EU countries will follow Germany’s lead no matter what. As a more 
conservative publication, this publication is already skeptical of European 
integration, even if it allows Germany to expand its regional authority, due to 
such situations as the country is encountering at present. 
 The EU summit in March 2016 was another important point in refugee 
policy. Der Spiegel lamented that Merkel “had no more partners” in her refugee 
policy, and invoked the controversial Sonderweg theory to describe Germany’s 
special path that led to this refugee response.50 At the same time, Merkel’s 
policy was receiving praise from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon as being 
the “voice of morality” in Europe today.51 Despite this praise, the CSU took the 
EU summit as an opportunity to further criticize Merkel’s refugee policy and the 
deal with Turkey agreed upon.52 Overall, the EU summit was an opportunity for 
all sides to try to increase their popularity while striving to come to a solution to 
this problem. The main source of strife was over the proper method of 
combating the refugee crisis and Syrian conflict, especially concerning the 
                                                 
49
 Berthold Kohler, “Die Schwachstellen in Merkels Formel,” Frankfurter Allgemeine, March 1, 
2016, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/fluechtlingspolitik-die-schwachstellen-in-
merkels-formel-14097709.html. 
50
 Diemar Riemer, “Merkel hat keine Partner mehr,” tagesschau, March 8, 2016, 
http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/merkel-1063.html. 
51
 “UN-Chef lobt Merkel as “Stimmung der Moral schlechthin,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 8, 
2016, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/pressekonferenz-in-berlin-un-chef-lobt-merkel-als-
stimme-der-moral-schlechthin-1.2896986. 
52
 “CSU kündigt Widerstand gegen Türkei-Deal an,” Zeit Online, March 8, 2016, 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-03/eu-gipfel-fluechtlinge-tuerkei-eu-angela-merkel-
reaktionen. 
20 
 
proper balance between preserving the well-being of one’s own citizens and 
protecting human rights. 
Terrorism 
 Terrorism has become a greater concern in Germany following the 
attacks in Paris in November 2015, especially since one of the attacks was 
planned for a soccer match between Germany and France.53  Although original 
concerns that those attacks were carried out by refugees proved to be 
unfounded, Germans remain concerned that some of the refugees may try to 
carry out attacks while in Germany. 
 The amount of concern over terrorism in Germany is clear through the 
country’s recent actions, which include calling off a soccer game in Hannover 
shortly following the Paris attacks. The German Interior Minister, Thomas de 
Maizière, said that the reason for this action would “greatly unsettle the 
population,” a statement that was greatly ridiculed throughout Germany.54 Der 
Spiegel points out that few answers could have unsettled the population more 
than de Maizière’s refusal to answer questions, although the magazine 
theorizes that the information must have been of a sort that would have caused 
a large magnitude of outrage in society.55 Additionally, the German spy agency 
has received over one hundred tips that some of the refugees are, in fact, 
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Islamic State militants.56 Whether or not these tips are related to actual attacks, 
the fact remains that Germans are much more concerned about terrorism 
happening within Germany than they were before the wave of refugees entered 
the country in 2015. This, coupled with uncertainty that the CDU-led coalition 
government is dealing with this threat in the best way, results in more 
vulnerability for Angela Merkel’s government. 
Economy 
 The German economy, despite a few recent high-level scandals, remains 
strong. The GDP grew in 2015 while unemployment reached record lows.57 
Since the economy and especially unemployment are always a concern for 
voters, the strong economy shows that despite turmoil in other areas of German 
governance, this may not be used as a bone of contention in next year’s federal 
elections and this year’s state elections. However, this means that the 
economic strength of individual states can be credited to the state governments, 
many of which are not CDU-led coalitions. 
 Another area where refugee policy intersects with the economy besides 
the practical side of taking care of those refugees within Germany comes in the 
form of foreign aid. Germany provides half the funds for the daily rations for 
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Syrians in the Middle East; additionally, the European Union agreed on 
monetary assistance to Turkey in exchange for taking back some refugees.58 
State Governments 
 These issues, although most important on the federal level, can also 
have implications for state politics. Although the CDU dominates the federal 
government, on the state level, coalitions that are not led by the CDU are fairly 
common. Thuringia, although unique in having a Left Party-led coalition 
government that will be discussed in the next chapter, is not the only state to 
have a non-CDU government at this time. However, the only other state with 
the Left Party in any sort of role is Brandenburg. The Left Party’s past as the 
Social Unity Party makes it appear to be an anti-democratic government based 
on a dictatorship to many German voters, especially in western Germany, 
despite that party’s reforms since 1989. Although the Left Party’s shaky claims 
to legitimacy prevent it from having power in most state governments, other 
states have formed left-wing coalitions between the Greens and the SPD. 
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Figure 2: Map of Germany 
 
 
Source: “Map of Germany with Cities and States,” World Atlas Book, accessed April 28, 2016, 
http://www.worldatlasbook.com/germany/germany-political-map.html. 
 
 Including Thuringia and Brandenburg, nine of the sixteen federal states 
have a government comprised of left-wing coalitions without the help of the 
CDU.59 Six of these coalitions are between the SPD and the Greens; 
Schleswig-Holstein has these two parties and a regional party in their coalition. 
Additionally, Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania have grand coalitions 
at the state level where the SPD is the senior partner.60 This leaves five states 
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where the right is in control, including the large and rich state of Bavaria, where 
the CSU has enough seats to rule without a coalition. 
 Although the Thuringian governmental coalition was a source of 
controversy in Germany due to the Left Party’s senior role, most state 
governments are run by a left-wing coalition. The Greens took the senior role in 
Baden-Wüttemberg in elections in March 2016, where the CDU and SPD took 
losses due to the rise of the AfD as well as a loss of esteem for the CDU.61 In 
Rhineland-Palatinate, the CDU took losses while the SPD finished in first 
place.62 The majority of German states already have left-wing parties in their 
state governments, with the exception of Bavaria. This suggests that members 
of left-wing parties already have experience working in governments, which 
could be important if they wish to be successful on the federal level 
independent of the CDU. 
  Despite the CDU’s dominance in German politics under Chancellor 
Merkel, this party has looked more vulnerable of late. The CSU is wavering in 
its devotion to the conservative bloc due to concerns about the refugee crisis 
and their recurring wish to impose tolls on the Autobahn.63 The drama between 
CSU leader Horst Seehofer and the CDU on the issues of refugees and border 
controls has been so public that the media refers to it as a “soap opera.”64 The 
                                                 
61
 “Grüne Macht im Landle, SPD siegt in Mainz, AfD stark,” tagesschau, March 13, 2016, 
http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/landtagswahlen-147.html. 
62
 Ibid. 
63
 Björn Hengst, “Merkel bei der CSU in Kreuth: Was kümmern sie die Kritiker,” Der Spiegel, 
January 20, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/angela-merkel-bei-der-csu-in-
kreuth-die-standhafte-a-1073051.html. 
64
 Severin Weiland. “Seehofer gegen Merkel: Dauerfeuer ohne Schlachtplan,” Der Spiegel, 
January 27, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/csu-horst-seehofers-dauerkritik-
schadet-den-cdu-wahlkaempfern-a-1074169.html. 
25 
 
drama between the two included a trip by Seehofer to Russia, where he met 
with Vladimir Putin, who currently is on the outs with Germany due to the 
ongoing occupation of Ukraine.65 Seehofer also made remarks comparing 
Merkel’s rule to the East German dictatorship.66 This inter-party strife also 
affected state elections in March 2016, which saw the CDU weakened in all 
three states that voted because the party was showing a non-unified front, 
which can make voters doubt its competency.67 Merkel has had to face criticism 
not only from the CSU, but also from members of her own party who wish to 
make Germany less open to asylum seekers, especially after the New Year’s 
Eve attacks in Cologne.68 
 The March 2016 elections in Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, 
and Saxony-Anhalt as well as elections in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and 
Berlin later in the year mean that members of the CDU must decide whether or 
not to distance themselves from Merkel in an effort to gain more votes. In 
Rhineland-Palatinate, CDU gubernatorial candidate Julia Klöckner has 
distanced herself from Merkel with her plan, “Plan A2,” which advocates CSU-
style reforms for Rhineland-Palatinate.69  The CDU in that state did not 
campaigning on the issues of migration or the refugee crisis because they 
                                                 
65
 Sebastian Fischer, “Seehofer bei Putin: Das falsche Signal,” Der Spiegel, February 4, 2016, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bayerischer-ministerpraesident-besucht-putin-
seehofers-fehler-a-1075639.html. 
66
 “Der Missverstandene,” tagesschau, February 10, 2016, 
http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/seehofer-merkel-129.html. 
67
 “Grüne Macht im Ländle,” tagesschau. 
68
 Severin Weiland. “Wien beschlieβt Obergrenze für Flüchtlinge: Es wird einsam um Merkel,” 
Der Spiegel, January 20, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-
oesterreich-macht-symbolpolitik-kommentar-a-1073011.html. 
69
 Matthias Bartsch, Jan Friedmann, and Steffen Winter. “Distanzieren oder verlieren.” Der 
Spiegel, January 30, 2016, 49. 
26 
 
wanted to avoid being tainted by the CDU’s national refugee policy.70 This sort 
of action is being taken in several states; it had a chance of succeeding 
because German voters often view the state and national party organizations as 
different bodies. This campaign was ultimately somewhat successful; the CDU 
finished in second place in Rhineland-Palatinate, but the party lost 3% of the 
vote in comparison to the previous election.71 
 Those who wish to see a more conservative Germany have taken to the 
streets in protest. This sort of protest movement has been quite popular since 
the end of 2014, when Pegida began to organize weekly protests in Dresden.72 
This group and similar groups throughout Germany protest against migrants in 
Europe; several of its leaders have been forced to resign after ties to neo-Nazi 
groups emerged.73 These groups demonstrate with slogans such as “Away with 
criminal foreigners!” and “Honor killings don’t belong in Germany!”74 The 
conservative populist AfD party has also become more popular among some 
conservative Germans following its founding in 2013, partly as a reaction to 
Merkel’s moderate stances.75  
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 Municipal elections in cities across the state of Hesse showed that the 
AfD has gained a greater share of the voters than previously expected.76 The 
party gained 13.2% of the votes state-wide, making it the third-largest party in 
the state. This is a potential problem for coalition building in Hesse because no 
party will form a coalition with the Euroskeptic AfD at this time. The party also 
received 24% of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt’s state election, which made it the 
second-strongest party after the CDU.77 Der Spiegel refers to the party’s 
triumph as “a sign of how wounded our democracy is.”78 
Reactions to Merkel’s slow decision making style have also escalated as 
of late. The German response to the ongoing refugee crisis had been slowly 
shifting before January 2016, but took a sharp turn after the New Year’s Eve 
attacks in Cologne. As other countries have made decisions concerning their 
borders and allowing new asylum seekers into the country quickly, Germans 
have become less patient with the sluggish response that their government is 
formulating. Merkel did quickly address some of the country’s concerns by 
putting forth measures that would allow refugees and asylum seekers to be 
deported for some crimes. This is different from the country’s previous laws that 
made it extremely difficult to deport refugees who had been convicted of crimes 
because it was previously thought that the danger involved in returning to a land 
of persecution was far greater than the ill caused by the crime.79 From intraparty 
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struggles to outside criticism, Merkel’s CDU is facing perhaps its largest 
challenge to date. 
Coalition Struggles 
 The CSU’s current policies are pulling away from those of the CDU. This 
is in part motivated by fears that Merkel’s policies will draw support away from 
the CSU in Bavaria and towards the AfD.80 This could end the era of single-
party rule by the CSU in Bavaria, which the government there is loath to see 
end. In order to prevent this from occurring, CSU leader Horst Seehofer is 
refusing to take a solid stance critical of Merkel’s current policies. When asked if 
his party would support Merkel for Chancellor if she continued her current 
course of action, he responded by saying, “Next question.”81 The Bavarian 
Süddeutsche Zeitung took this as a sign that the coalition between the CDU 
and CSU is vulnerable. 
 The SPD and the CDU are the begrudging members of the Grand 
Coalition. This has become more and more controversial as the CDU becomes 
more conservative on the issue of refugee movement. Some within the SPD 
think the party should go along with the more conservative attitude of the CDU, 
while others believe that their place is to the left of the CDU no matter what. 
There are fears by some within the SPD that their party is becoming the 
midpoint between Angela Merkel and Horst Seehofer in this coalition, which is 
not a place where they want to be politically because it destroys their credibility 
as a moderate center-left party if the center-right party is espousing the exact 
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same policies.82  Although some members of the SPD despair that Merkel has 
moved the CDU to a place left of center where the SPD wants to govern, others 
believe that they have an obligation to stay to the left of the CDU in order to 
pursue fair social policies.83 This sort of coalition has greatly weakened the 
SPD; the Tagesschau deems the party well on its way to a “super disaster” due 
to a lack of self-awareness and earlier political mistakes.84 The SPD’s weak 
leadership is also deemed to be a fatal flaw that prevents the party from gaining 
greater power. Additionally, the SPD is associated with the current government, 
even though it is only the junior partner, which could do harm to the party come 
election time. 
Uptick in Popularity 
 Although Merkel had been losing support in Germany, especially since 
the New Year’s Eve assaults, her popularity has recently begun to climb again. 
This coincides with a drop in popularity for Bavarian Horst Seehofer, although 
many Germans still disagree with Merkel’s government’s refugee policy.85 The 
SPD and its leader, Sigmar Gabriel, have also suffered a slight drop in 
popularity as German opinion returns to Merkel’s side.86 This marks an 
important turn-around for Merkel and the future of her party on the federal level. 
This is also due to the fading memory of New Year’s Eve as new stories take 
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over the media, especially as the threat of the far-right is foremost in German 
minds due to a court case that may see the far-right German National Party 
outlawed nationwide. The decline in Merkel’s popularity may have been 
exaggerated by the media, who stand to benefit from a long national 
conversation over Merkel and the CDU’s ability to govern, so the uptick in 
popularity represents a return to the normal state of affairs. No matter what the 
reasons for the rise in popularity for Merkel, it may prove to be an important 
factor in the 2016 regional elections. 
Conclusion 
 The CDU has been massively popular in Germany over the past ten 
years. However, various domestic and foreign policy situations have caused a 
great shift in German attitudes towards their government in the past year. The 
refugee crisis in particular is driving some German voters to the right, while 
others within the governing coalition are becoming less sure of Merkel’s 
leadership.  
Although the CDU appears to be more vulnerable now than it has over 
the past ten years, recent poll data that shows a rise in Angela Merkel’s 
popularity is a sign that the party is not actually as vulnerable as the press 
makes it out to be. The political taboos in German politics are also important for 
the future of coalition-building. The Left Party is poised to emerge from their 
pariah status as the populist AfD works to differentiate itself from other parties 
by taking controversial positions.  The Left Party as well as the CDU is seeing 
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some of their voters leave to support the AfD.87 Voters who are dissatisfied with 
the way the government is handling the refugee crisis are, overall, moving 
further to the right, not to the left.  
One political outcome that is often overlooked on the federal level is a 
left-wing coalition. The current uncertainty facing the political right could be a 
boon to those on the left, especially if the AfD continues to rise in popularity and 
take votes away from former CDU voters. Therefore, it is useful to look at the 
SPD and the Greens’ place in contemporary German politics. In Thuringia, the 
left-wing has already taken advantage of the vote loss the AfD caused the CDU 
to form a broad coalition. The Left Party in particular is often cast aside when 
discussing federal German politics due to the political taboo, the Left Party’s 
small size, and its past as the party-state in East Germany. However, this party 
has recently come to power as the senior partner in a coalition in the German 
state of Thuringia that could serve as a model nationwide.  
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Chapter 2: The SPD and the Greens 
 The German Social Democratic Party and Alliance ’90/the Greens are 
the two major players in left-wing German politics. These parties have both 
been in power on the federal and state levels as partners. This chapter 
examines these parties, how they differ from one another, and how the two 
have reacted to ten years of CDU rule in Germany as part of this paper’s 
attempt to analyze the current trends in left-wing German politics and to add to 
the argument that the left-wing in Germany can exploit the current situation to 
create a governing coalition. 
A Short History of Both Parties 
 The SPD was founded in 1863. This makes it the oldest of the parties in 
modern Germany.88 The SPD also made up the majority of left-wing votes cast 
on the national level in the last election.89  Although it started as a left-wing 
populist movement, over time the party has become more centrist, which was 
one reason why the Greens organized into a separate party.90 The SPD had its 
first taste of governing Germany from 1969-1983, although the party is much 
more accustomed to sitting in the opposition on the national level.91  
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The Greens only began to split from the SPD following World War II, a 
move that was formalized when the Greens creating their own party in 1980.92 
The founding of the Greens is important because it shows the ways in which the 
two parties differ and issues on which the parties disagree, most significantly on 
the importance of the environment and globalization in their electoral program. 
This split came as more and more members of the radical Left felt alienated 
from the more moderate SPD, especially as the German Communist Party 
(KPD) was discredited and surrounded by a taboo in the postwar period, 
removing the only path to power for the radical left in Germany.93  
The Greens merged with East Germany’s environmental party, 
Alliance90, in 1990 after German reunification to formally become 
Alliance90/The Greens.94 The West German Greens saw reunification as a type 
of globalization and opposed it on ideological grounds. However, once 
reunification occurred the two parties merged to form one environmental party. 
Although the Greens were originally a hodgepodge of left-wing ideologies that 
were not being addressed by the SPD, the party has become more centrist over 
time.95 Philip Oltermann from The Guardian says that in some states “the 
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Greens have re-interpreted the environmental movement as a decidedly centrist 
project.”96  
 The Greens are divided into two fundamental camps: the Realos and the 
Fundis. The Realos stand for progressive reform, while the Fundis are the 
“revolutionary” wing of the party which is much more dogmatic than the 
Realos.97 Unlike in Marxist dogma, the revolution that the Fundis seek concerns 
the ecological crisis, not the idea of workers uniting.98 Although the Fundis are 
not seeking a workers’ revolution, they are still more Left radical than Realos, 
who are more moderate.99 The split means that some are more open to 
compromising their beliefs in order to work towards change in a coalition, while 
others are firm in their core beliefs. 
 Practically, both the CDU and SPD denied that the Greens were a 
mainstay of German politics until the mid-1980s, when the political situation in 
Hesse called for an alliance between the Greens and the SPD.100 The CDU 
continued to ignore the Greens until the Chernobyl disaster, which made the 
cause of ending nuclear power more important in German politics.101 
The parties reached their joint peak national influence in 1998, when a 
red-green coalition ruled Germany. In 1998, both the Greens and the SPD 
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focused on running a positive campaign.102 The SPD in particular was careful to 
use sophisticated polling techniques throughout the election season in order to 
ensure that their message would resonate with a large number of voters. The 
campaign strategy also included the motto “new center” in order to try to pull 
voters away from the CDU. However, this resulted in a campaign that was not 
focused on concrete issues and campaign promises.103 Despite this 
shortcoming in election techniques, the SPD won the largest percentage of 
seats in that election and formed a coalition with the Greens. 
Differences in Policy 
 Although the Greens and the SPD take similar stances on some issues, 
such as the importance of reducing dependence on fossil fuels, on other issues 
the parties differ.104 In some places, the Greens are more conservative than the 
SPD. In Germany, regional and local parties can differ from the national party’s 
views to a certain extent. Refugee politics have caused both parties to make 
interesting decisions. A prime example of this is in Baden-Württemberg, where 
the Greens have made themselves into a centrist party with support for big 
business and openly support Angela Merkel’s approach to the refugee crisis.105 
In Essen, the local SPD organization attempted to demonstrate against a new 
refugee housing center until the state and national party stepped in.106 
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 Ideologically, the Greens accepted communist-sympathizers at a time in 
the late twentieth century when communists and the radical left were not 
welcome in the SPD.107 The ideology of ecosocialism, which combines regard 
for the environment with the idea of social transformation, is another important 
way that the SPD and Greens differ.108 The people who would later create the 
Greens were also supporters of the student protests of 1968, which the SPD did 
not approve of despite their origins in the SPD’s student organization, German 
Socialist Student Organization (SDS).109 This organization was abolished in 
1970, and student members were discouraged from joining the SPD proper.110 
State Level Politics 
 The left wing is present in the majority of state-level governments. 
Although the SPD is the most common coalition leader, the Greens and Left 
Party lead one coalition government each. While both the Greens and SPD 
have been open to working with the CDU, the Green/CDU alliance in Baden-
Württemberg has recently made news as Winfried Kretschmann, the first Green 
governor in Germany, was reelected in March 2016.111 
 The current government compositions show that the SPD, Greens, and 
Left Party are all more successful on the state level than on the national level at 
present. This points back to the theory that Germans view state and national 
branches of political parties as distinct entities; although they may support their 
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local left-wing party, on the national level they still warm to Angela Merkel’s 
CDU. 
Table 1: Left-Wing Leadership in German Coalitions, May 2016 
State Coalition Government 
Baden-Württemberg Greens/CDU 
Berlin SPD/CDU 
Brandenburg SPD/Left Party 
Bremen SPD/Greens 
Hamburg SPD/Greens 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania SPD/CDU 
Lower Saxony SPD/Greens 
North Rhine-Westphalia SPD/Greens 
Rhineland-Palatinate SPD/FDP/Greens 
Schleswig-Holstein SPD/Greens/SSW* 
Thuringia Left Party/SPD/Greens 
* SSW (South Schleswig Voters' Association) is a regional party representing Danish and 
Frisian interests. 
Source: “Mitglieder des Bundesrates,” Bundesrat. 
 
National Politics 
 Both the SPD and the Greens have had experience in national 
governance, most recently from 1998-2005 for the Greens and at present for 
the SPD.112 In the Bundesrat, both parties enjoy a high level of representation 
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because seats on this council are dependent on the composition of the state 
governments.  
 It is possible for the SPD to be the senior partner in a government that 
cannot be defined as a left-wing coalition. This has occurred in the past when 
the SPD partnered with the FDP from 1969-1983.113 It is unlikely that this 
coalition would be repeated nationally in the near future, both due to the FDP’s 
current weakness that prevents it from being seated in the Bundestag and a 
shift in both parties’ politics that make such a coalition unlikely according to 
minimal connected winning coalition theory.114  
 Either the SPD or the Greens could form a winning coalition it the future. 
The Greens especially stand to gain from the loss of support for the SPD as 
well as the split in the right-wing vote that result from the AfD’s recent success. 
This could pave the way for the Greens to leverage their success on the state 
level in a federal election, especially as their views are conservative on some 
topics but liberal on others. 
 A left-wing coalition would benefit from a strong, well-known leader who 
could bring out a variety of voters on election day. As the Left Party could not 
hope to gain a large enough vote share to name the Chancellor this must fall to 
the SPD or the Greens. This truth is acknowledged by Left Party politician 
Sahra Wagenknecht, who says that “no one expects that we can build a 
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coalition without a specific partnership.”115 In 2013, Left Party co-chairperson 
Bernd Riexinger spoke of the “obligation that the left of center parties have to 
participate in serious talks to promote social change.”116 Currently, the most 
likely candidate for the SPD in 2017 is current Vice Chancellor Sigmar 
Gabriel.117 His political experience makes him a decent choice for left-wing 
voters, although his involvement in the current government has the potential to 
hurt him in a national election. This decision is by no means final. The SPD’s 
ongoing search for a chancellor candidate has been widely covered in German 
media, with Der Spiegel creating a facetious job ad for the position.118  
 One of the hurdles that would need to be overcome in order to form a 
left-wing coalition nationally would be the taboo within the SPD against working 
with the Left Party. Some progress has already been made on this front as the 
national SPD leadership has allowed state parties to decide individually whether 
or not to work with the Left Party. The official national taboo was vaguely 
denounced in 2013, but no actual action has come from this shift so far.119 
Since the left-wing government in Thuringia is going well, this could help to 
sway national leadership away from the national taboo to help bring their party 
to federal power. However, this may not be enough to keep the SPD from 
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working with the CDU or FDP over the Left Party, especially since the initial 
voter outcry in Thuringia was severe. The protests against the red-red-green 
government there were not directed at the Left Party; they were directed at the 
SPD with demonstrators who claimed that “we’re not right-wingers. Most of us 
are SPD members.”120 In states of western Germany, working with the Left 
Party would be even harder than in Thuringia. The main draw for the SPD in 
this situation would be the opportunity to be much larger than their coalition 
partner, in line with minimal connected winning coalition theory.121 
 The SPD and the Greens are also dealing with issues of trust that have 
been ongoing since Gerhard Schröder was Chancellor from 1998-2005.122 
These issues stem from the Hartz welfare reforms and Agenda 2010, both of 
which cut social benefits as well as taxes in Germany.123 As the SPD tends to 
focus on social electoral issues, this hurt their image as a social democratic 
party, and is an issue on which they are often attacked today as the reforms 
have been fairly unpopular. This is partly because the Hartz reforms were only 
expected to succeed if every aspect succeeded. The reforms promised new full-
day schools and daycare, but when this did not go as planned, the cutting of 
unemployment benefits was seen as especially harmful.124 These issues drove 
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a wedge between the SPD and the Left Party because of the Left Party strongly 
supports social programs and uses this against the SPD in each election cycle 
since the reforms passed.125 Additionally, the SPD is present in most of the 
state governments, but has not been particularly successful in any one 
according to the Süddeutsche Zeitung.126 This means that even in places where 
the SPD candidate for governor may be extremely popular, the SPD still faces 
an uphill battle due to its record. 
Relationship with the Left Party 
 The Left Party has a more complicated relationship with the SPD and the 
Greens than the two parties have with each other. Part of this is due to 
continuing east-west differences within Germany. The Left Party is traditionally 
a more eastern party while the Greens are more successful in western states 
despite efforts from both parties to reach across this boundary. 
 The taboo that the SPD still has on the national level to a certain extent 
is a hindrance to SPD-Left Party relations. The beginnings of this taboo being 
broken occurred in October 2000, when the Left Party’s Bisky met with 
Chancellor Schröder to finalize a tax plan in the first meeting between the PDS 
and the SPD.127 However, some of the SPD’s younger members believe that 
the SPD’s future lies with the left-wing instead of the CDU. Youth party chair 
Johanna Uekermann stated that the SPD “needs a red-red-green coalition. You 
                                                 
125
 Lachmann, “Rot-Rot-Grün im Bund? Die Linke hegt groβe Zweifel.” 
126
 Denkler, “Fünf Gründe, warum die Lage der SPD so schwierig ist.” 
127
 Jonathan Olsen, “The PDS after Gysi: A Report from the PDS Congress in Cottbus,” 
German Politics and Society 19 (2001): 65. 
42 
 
can’t have a social program with the CDU.”128 These views are shared by some 
in the SPD’s higher ranks as well. Federal party vice chair Ralf Stegner has 
said that he would be willing to work with the Left Party, but “the Left Party must 
finally decide whether it wants to remain in the opposition…or make serious 
compromises and develop itself into a federal party.”129 Even the SPD chair 
Sigmar Gabriel showed the party’s openness to breaking the taboo as early as 
2013, when he stated that the SPD “would not eliminate any party on principle” 
from coalition talks in the future.130 Gabriel’s statement was taken as a vague 
promise meant to pacify the left wing of the SPD because it has not had the 
opportunity to be put into play yet. This promise also does not guarantee that 
the SPD membership will be open to such a coalition; a sort of “Mauer im Kopf” 
(“mental Berlin wall”) may prevent SPD-Left Party cooperation. 
The Magdeburg Model, in which a SPD-Green coalition was tolerated by 
the PDS, was in control in the state of Saxony-Anhalt from 1994-1998.131 From 
1998-2002 the SPD was only able to form a ruling coalition with direct support 
from the PDS.132 However, this coalition was controversial at the time; the 
national SPD leadership condemned the state party for allowing a cooperation 
that was completely out of the question for them.133 Since then, the SPD has 
mellowed in their views; the Thuringian coalition is not as controversial as the 
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Magdeburg Model because it successfully demonstrated how a left-wing 
coalition could function. 
 An unsuccessful red-red-green coalition was discussed following state 
elections in Hesse in 2008.134 Since neither the CDU nor the SPD had enough 
votes with its preferred coalition partner to form a government, the SPD began 
talks with the Hessian Left Party. This proved to be a poor choice because the 
SPD was unable to form a coalition; ultimately new elections were called and 
the SPD lost votes after trying to work with the Left Party. A similar situation 
occurred in Thuringia in 2009; red-red-green coalition talks were unable to 
produce a viable coalition, in part due to the SPD’s national party discouraging 
such a coalition at that time.135 Eventually, the CDU was successful in forming a 
coalition and the Left Party was placed in the opposition. 
Reactions to CDU Power 
 In the western state of Baden-Württemberg, the Greens have thrown 
their support wholeheartedly behind Chancellor Merkel, who was accused of 
supporting a Green candidate in regional elections over the candidate from her 
own party.136 This opens up the idea that the CDU and Greens could possibly 
work together in the future, as was discussed following the national election of 
2005. The CDU has indicated that it would be willing to create such a coalition 
following the election of 2013.137 
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 The SPD has been losing support for quite some time, dropping to 
historic lows in May 2016, when German broadcaster ARD reported that public 
approval for the party stood at twenty percent.138 The SPD, according to 
Deutsche Welle, is suffering because the CDU has moved into many center-left 
positions.139 The SPD cannot respond by moving further left because that place 
is already occupied by the Greens and the Left Party. Such a move could also 
cause the SPD’s centrist core to change its support. Even though the SPD is 
currently in the federal coalition government, it is still struggling with its identity 
and place in German politics more than any other party today. 
Conclusion 
 The SPD and the Greens have become mainstays in German politics. 
Both parties, however, are more accustomed to sitting in the opposition on the 
national level than being in power. On the state level both parties have 
achieved much more success. Slipping SPD poll numbers could in the future 
lead to changes within the left-wing of German politics and indicates a current 
lack of confidence in the party among the public, which could lead to the 
Greens becoming more influential as well as finding these two parties in the 
need of Left Party support. However, the status of the parties at present leaves 
the SPD as the major leftist player on the national level with all three left-wing 
parties achieving some measure of success regionally. 
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 The Left Party’s place in German politics is different than that of the other 
two parliamentary left-wing parties because it is much shorter, less experienced 
with power and more closely related to the history of the German Democratic 
Republic. The SPD and Greens are long-suffering players in German politics on 
every level; the Left Party is just beginning to rise above their small populist 
roots. 
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Chapter 3: Testfall Thüringen 
 Although Germany has been overwhelmingly led by the center left and 
center right since the end of World War II, in some cases other parties have had 
luck in being junior coalition partners as well as being the senior partner in one 
recent case. Due to continuing issues of trust with the Left Party in Germany, it 
was not possible for that party to lead a coalition beyond the local level until 
quite recently. In the Thuringian state elections in September 2014, the CDU 
won the largest number of seats in the state’s parliament, but the party was 
unable to form a ruling coalition. This allowed the Left Party to form the first 
state-level governing coalition in that party’s post-1989 history.140 The election 
results and voter polls from this election can also help to determine whether 
Thuringian voter interests line up with overall German interest in a way that 
makes the results an acceptable case study for the Federal Republic. Although 
not without controversy, this coalition has since been in office for more than a 
year and has not confirmed naysayer fears that the party would attempt another 
dictatorship. Despite the unlikelihood of such an event occurring, members of 
the CDU including Angela Merkel were so upset at the prospect of a Left Party-
led coalition that such fears were publically aired.141 This leftist coalition, 
sometimes viewed as a model for future federal coalitions because the SPD 
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and CDU’s places in national politics have become less certain, has become 
known in the media as Testfall Thüringen, or Test Case Thuringia. 
The formation of the left-wing coalition government in Thuringia was 
controversial not only locally, but on the national and international levels as 
well. The CDU in particular had many harsh words concerning this coalition.  
Others in left-wing parties and the media have postulated that the left-wing 
coalition is a model that could be altered to create a left-wing path to power on 
the national level in Germany.142 This claim is supported by the Thuringian 
government’s normal governance so far, which is serving to disappoint fears 
that the Left Party remained too radical to oversee the practical governance of a 
state. 
The controversy over this coalition was not limited to German media, 
which both criticized and praised the Thuringian case. Der Spiegel pointed out 
that this was an historic event that would set the stage for future Left Party 
success if the coalition governed well.143 The historic nature of the Left Party 
being the senior coalition partner brought international attention to Thuringian 
politics.  The Financial Times deemed the East German government to be 
among the worst in Europe, but also allowed that the experiment could be good 
for German politics because it allows difference voices to be heard on the state 
level; the idea is that more parties being viable coalition partners increases civil 
discourse.144 The Times was less sympathetic to the experiment, focusing on 
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Thuringia’s relative poverty and the unjust actions taken by the East German 
state as well as the criticism that German President Joachim Gauck had for the 
state government.145 Overall, English language publications seemed wary of 
expecting too much from this coalition, although they acknowledge that 
cooperation between the SPD and the Left Party may be necessary to knock 
the CDU out of federal power. Regional German elections do not often make 
international news. This coalition was cause for attention due to the Left Party’s 
senior status and for the wider implications it has for German politics. 
 This chapter will look at the case study of Thuringia as part of current 
German politics. I examine the specific policies that the Left Party-led coalition 
has pursued in order to determine that the Left Party can govern successfully 
within the political mainstream. The idea of a leftist coalition is not without 
precedence, with state governments having such coalitions in several cases, 
albeit without the Left Party. Such a government on the federal level could 
include a combination of the Left Party, the SPD, or the Greens, with a 
SPD/Green coalition being more likely than one involving the Left Party. In fact, 
a SPD/Green coalition was the governing national coalition from 1998-2005.146 
Despite a lack of experience in governing on the federal level, the Left Party is 
now twenty-five years removed from the Social Unity Party and East Germany, 
which makes it more viable now than ever before. This sets the Left Party apart 
from other small parties such as the AfD, which is more of a flash of populism 
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than a long-term party with steady growth, among several differentiating factors. 
This could be vital in breaking the national taboo against working with the Left 
Party by other left-wig parties. I argue that Germany’s left-wing parties could 
exploit the idea of the CDU being vulnerable under Angela Merkel in order to 
create a new federal government in 2017, an opportunity that the Left Party has 
not had since 1989. 
The Left Party 
The Left Party in Germany has had a long road from pariah status in the 
early 1990s to being a federal parliamentary party today that could potentially 
become part of a governing coalition. The party evolved from East Germany’s 
SED to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) after German reunification. 
The SED led the party-state dictatorship in East Germany which made its 
successors unappealing to voters in western Germany, despite the party’s 
expulsion of hardline socialist in 1989.147 Additionally, the original members of 
the PDS were those who opposed reunification because they wanted an 
opportunity to govern East Germany as an independent, democratic country, 
which further hurt their chances to grow in the western part of the country.  
Other members who were only involved in the SED for the benefits, including 
university educations for their children and job choice, left as soon as these 
benefits disappeared.148 However, the idea of the PDS being the successor 
party to the SED implied that it was holding up the “tradition of the German 
workers’ movement of the twentieth century, which continues to prioritize the 
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social over market freedom” in addition to the negative connotations.149 
Members grew disillusioned and left the party for others that had a better 
chance at actual political power. One of the effects this had on the Left Party 
was a series of reinventions that saw the SED change to the PDS and from the 
PDS to the Left Party.PDS to the modern-day Left Party. 
By 2000, the party was in a state of turmoil as two of the party’s leaders, 
Gregor Gysi and Lothar Bisky, resigned their posts.150 Both men remained part 
of the PDS; Gysi remained a leading politician for the Left Party until late 
2015.151 In 2001, PDS chair Gabriele Zimmer apologized for the forced 
combination of the KPD and SPD to form the SED following World War II.152 
This is one in a series of steps the PDS took to set itself apart from the SED, 
which started when the PDS deleted mentions of Lenin and Marxism from their 
party platform in 1990.153 This evolved as the PDS’s 1993 program said “there 
were mistakes, wrong tracks, sins of omission, and even crimes” in East 
Germany.154 
Electoral results for the PDS started out low and grew over time as the 
residents of eastern Germany adjusted to life in a democratic society and the 
differences that their new freedoms wrought in their lives.155 Initial votes for 
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West German parties fell as the changes in East German lives became evident. 
Although the PDS was expected to fade away as the older generation in charge 
who opposed German reunification died, the party instead experienced a 
renaissance as it became popular with blue-collar workers in eastern Germany 
as well as former SPD members who felt that the party had moved too far to the 
right.156 The SPD’s move to become the “neue Mitte” (“new center”) was 
beneficial to the PDS, although it was also beneficial for the SPD itself.157 The 
shift to the center pushed some left-wing members of the SPD out of the party. 
Former SPD chairman Oskar Lafontaine left the party to form the Electoral 
Alternative for Labor and Social Justice (WASG).158 The WASG was a party 
that remained loyal to more left-leaning social democratic policies. 
Table 2: PDS Election Results 
Year Percentage of Vote 
1990 2.3% 
1994 4.1% 
1998 4.9% 
2002 4.3% 
2005* 8% 
 
* In 2005, the Left Party ran as Left Party.PDS in the federal election. 
Source: “Results of the Bundestag Elections 1949-2013,” Der Bundeswahlleiter, accessed May 
9, 2016, https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/fruehere_bundestagswahlen/. 
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Die Linke, or the Left Party, was formed in 2007 from the PDS, which 
had the majority of its support in eastern Germany, and the WASG, which was 
based in western Germany.159 Since the PDS was widely considered a regional 
party and was associated with the East German state, their electoral success 
was quickly outstripped by that of the Left Party. The Left Party was successful 
in elections on the state, national, and European levels throughout 2009 and 
became the largest party in the opposition to a grand coalition in Germany’s 
Bundestag in 2013. This is especially significant for the Left Party because with 
ten percent of the seats in the Bundestag, their influence has increased enough 
to make them a viable coalition partner if a larger party comes only a few seats 
shy of a majority.160 The proportional representation and two-vote system gave 
the Left Party 2% more seats in the final Bundestag than they received through 
direct election. However, the CDU and SPD have been unwilling to work with 
this group on the federal level thus far because of concerns among the 
population and the party leadership about their ability to govern fairly in a free 
society; CDU and SPD leadership is also worried about the ramifications from 
voters that could result from working with the Left Party. 
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Table 3: Left Party Federal and European Election Results, 2009-2016 
Year Election Percentage of Vote 
2009 European Parliament 7.5% 
2009 Federal Election 11.1% 
2013 Federal Election 8.2% 
2014 European Parliament 7.4% 
 
Sources: “Results of the Bundestag Elections 1949-2013,” Der Bundeswahlleiter. 
“Seats by Member State,” European Parliament, accessed May 9, 2016, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/seats-member-state-absolut.html. 
 
The Election of 2014 
 
 In the German state of Thuringia, the Left Party had long been more 
popular than it was in states in western Germany. The PDS’s lowest election 
result in the state was 9.7% of the vote in the first state elections following 
reunification in 1990, but by 2004, that percentage had increased to 26%.161 
Despite this, Thuringia had always been ruled by the CDU or a CDU-led 
coalition since the state was given back its administrative power following 
German reunification.162 In the September 2014 elections, the Left Party 
received 28% of the vote, second only to the CDU.  
The Left Party campaigned on a platform that was largely comprised of 
social issues, including more daycare facilities, better educational opportunities 
for young Thuringians, opposition to right-wing extremism, increased protection 
for refugees, and strengthening the economy by allowing for increased 
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collective bargaining rights for employees as well as better regulation of 
government funds.163 Some of these stances mirror official positions of the SED 
during the Cold War; however, positions including the equality of the sexes and 
universal daycare are no longer coupled with authoritarian rule and a one-party 
regime. Voters in this election listed work and education as the two most 
important issues to them; the Left Party as well as the other parties campaigned 
heavily surrounding these issues.164 
 These issues were important to the current events of the time; refugees 
had been trickling into Germany from Syria for over a year at that point, 
although the flood of refugees was still to come. The Left Party always 
campaigns on a platform of anti-right wing sentiment. In some elections, the 
anti-Nazi sentiment seems to overpower the actual policy positions that the 
party has, although in this case it can be argued that the right wing helped them 
come to power. The CDU was unable to form a majority government in part 
because the Alternative for Germany (AfD) received ten percent of the vote and 
eleven seats in the Thuringian state parliament.165 The AfD is a relatively new 
party that is further to the right than the CDU; their campaign drew some votes 
away from the CDU and served to pull some CDU views a bit further to the 
right, which further hurt their appeal to more moderate voters. The CDU is also 
a bit more constrained than any of the parties on the left because it cannot 
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easily form coalitions with the parties to its right in order to create a coalition 
without compromising some of its core beliefs and its historical stance towards 
extremism. Additionally, the CDU’s preferred coalition partners of the Greens 
and the FDP do not always receive enough votes to form a coalition with the 
CDU; the FDP is currently not seated in the Thuringian parliament, while the 
Greens were unable to cobble together a coalition with the CDU following the 
previous election because the two groups together did not have a majority of 
seats.166 
Voter Analysis 
Understanding the types of voters who turned out for the election in 
Thuringia is important for understanding what kinds of voters might make a left-
dominated government possible on the federal level again. On September 14, 
2014, 954,927 voters cast their ballots.167 This was only fifty percent of the 
eligible voters in Thuringia; the vote was the last in a series of four votes as part 
of the Superwahljahr (super voting year) which included elections for local, 
state, federal, and European representatives. In real terms, all of the parties 
sustained a net loss of votes except for the AfD; percentagewise, only the CDU, 
Left Party, and AfD experienced a growth.168  
Overall, the CDU received 33.5% of the vote, while the Left Party 
received 28.2%.169 Combined, the conservative parties received 50.2% of the 
vote, but two of the conservative parties did not reach the five percent hurdle to 
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be seated in the state parliament. These two parties, the FDP and the neo-Nazi 
German National Party (NPD), received 6.1% of the vote together, which is a 
small percentage, but accounts for 57,408 votes.170 This shows that over 
50,000 voters do not currently have their views represented in the state 
parliament.   
 A pre-election demographic poll showed both opinions towards parties in 
Thuringia as well as those nationwide, which is important for discerning whether 
Thuringia is an outlier in German politics or a valid example to use as a model 
for future coalitions. In Thuringia, positive opinion for the Left Party is higher 
than in the rest of the country, while Thuringian approval of the SPD and the 
Greens is slightly lower than the average German approval rating.171 The exact 
poll question, however, asked about the opinion of the federal parliamentary 
fractions of the party. Since many Germans differentiate between the party on 
the state and federal levels, this may not be as useful in gaging opinion towards 
Thuringian parliamentary parties as a poll on individual state parties, although 
the actual election results show that the poll was accurate on this subject. 
 More interesting is the data looking at the ability of the Left Party to rule a 
state. Forty-eight percent of those asked did not trust the Left Party to govern 
their state; this percentage was higher among CDU, SPD, and AfD voters and 
demonstrates the political taboo against this party.172 Since the question 
specifically named Left Party politician and current governor of Thuringia Bodo 
Ramelow, who is originally from Lower Saxony, as the potential governor of the 
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state under the Left Party’s government, the results cannot be discounted as 
fear of an East German leader, which is one concern that some voters have 
concerning the Left Party. This distrust could be higher on the national level 
since the national approval for the Left Party is lower than it is in Thuringia.  
 The actual demographics for those voting in Thuringia can also help 
predict national paths to power. The CDU is more attractive to Catholic and 
Protestant voters, with 55% of Catholic and 41% of Protestant voters favoring 
that party, while those who do not practice Christianity are more likely to vote 
for the Left Party.173 Since 57% of the voters in Thuringia do not identify as 
Christians, this is less important than it might be in western Germany, where 
religion was not censured by the government.174 Younger voters did not turn out 
as heavily as older voters did for this election. This is important because older 
voters in Thuringia are more likely to vote for the Left Party as a result of some 
nostalgia for East Germany’s social benefits. Although younger voters are more 
likely to vote for the CDU than the Left Party, their low voter turnout meant that 
the Left Party had the opportunity to form a governing coalition. Other factors, 
such as education level or gender, did not appear to be significant factors in 
determining voter preference.  
Coalition Formation 
 After the election of 2014, the coalition forming process took place. The 
CDU was unsuccessful in its attempts to form a coalition with other parties; the 
Left Party was successful in creating a one-vote majority through its coalition 
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with the SPD and the Greens. This was not the first time that the Left Party had 
come in second to the CDU; it was simply the first time the Left Party had come 
in second to the CDU and successfully formed a ruling coalition. In 2009, 
negotiations to form a left-centric government were underway in Thuringia, but 
the parties were unable to come to an agreement.175  
Until recently, the SPD was forbidden from forming a coalition 
government with the Left Party in the lead by the national SPD leadership 
because the SPD did not trust the Left Party to govern democratically. This 
coalition was possible because of a shift in the SPD’s national views that allows 
each state’s party to decide such issues on its own. In part, this was influenced 
by the success of the Magdeburg Model.176 The members of the SPD in 
Thuringia were sent ballots and allowed to vote either in favor of or in opposition 
to forming a coalition government with the Left Party and the Greens.177 
However, since many German voters do not have membership in a party, 
Thuringians who voted for the SPD without being a member were quite upset 
that the party decided to enter into a taboo-breaking coalition with a party that is 
still strongly associated with East Germany in many minds. This resulted in 
protests at the steps of the cathedral in Erfurt, the Thuringian capital, which 
mirrored protests that took place twenty years prior against the SED.178 
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Protesters help up banners with slogans such as “Who has betrayed us? The 
Social Democrats!” and “Stasi in the state house – is this the voters’ will?” to 
show their dissatisfaction with the SPD’s decision to join forces with the Left 
Party.179 
As a part of the coalition talks, the three parties that formed the coalition 
known as R2G (red-red-green after the colors of the three parties) signed a 
document recognizing the dictatorship that the SED had in East Germany.180 
This issue is still very controversial within the Left Party because some 
members do not believe that East Germany was a dictatorship and are reluctant 
to denounce their former government, especially if they were members of the 
SED themselves. This is one reason why the Left Party has found it difficult to 
participate in coalition governments with other left-wing parties in the past. 
Nationally, the party has refused to totally denounce the East German state as 
a dictatorship, which makes the Thuringian branch’s reluctant agreement to 
sign this document even more important. The document signed by the 
Thuringian coalition gave a list of reasons why East Germany was 
“consequently a dictatorship,” which some from other parties found to be a bit 
cagey due to the noncommittal tone of the piece.181  
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 After all the votes were counted, the Left Party was officially the leading 
partner in the new coalition government that took control in December 2014.182 
This is the first time this has happened on the state level in reunified Germany; 
in previous coalitions the Left Party was always the junior partner. As such, the 
leader of the Left Party in Thuringia, Bodo Ramelow, became the governor.  
Ramelow was raised in West Germany and came to Thuringia after the 
Berlin Wall fell. This means that he avoids some problematic associations with 
the SED since he first joined the PDS in 1999.183 His leftist views are still the 
source of some controversy in Thuringia since some criticize him for being a 
member of a party that oppressed a country in which he did not reside. 
However, it seems unlikely that the other two parties in the coalition would 
consent to join forces with a former member of the SED. This would not be 
tolerated by voters; past lives as Stasi collaborators have come back to haunt 
more than one member of the Left Party.184 Despite this and the poll showing a 
low level of confidence in a Left Party governor before the election, Ramelow 
has now led Thuringia for over a year. 
R2G in Office 
Since this coalition took office, the refugee crisis has greatly increased all 
over Germany; right wing parties have been demonstrating in large numbers 
against the flow of immigrants into the country. The Left Party in Thuringia has 
countered by welcoming refugees while also calling for lasting solutions to the 
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problem. As the ruling party in Thuringia, the Left Party has continued to 
campaign against the far right by promoting anti-right wing rallies. The Left 
Party also made May 8 a state holiday to commemorate the German surrender 
in World War II.185 The coalition government’s actions in foreign policy, the 
refugee crisis, social policy, and federal legislation form a picture of the 
government’s first year in office. However, despite the controversy 
accompanying the coalition building process in Thuringia, the government has 
not taken any steps that represent a serious deviation from policy under the 
Christian Democratic government, which serves to bolster the reputation of the 
Left Party. Despite claims from the opposition to the contrary, the Left Party is 
capable of ruling successfully within a democratic system. The following 
sections will look at foreign policy, social policy, the refugee crisis, and 
Thuringian representation in the Bundesrat in order to determine that the 
current government is not operating outside the political mainstream.  
Foreign Policy 
 Although foreign policy is not the first thing that comes to mind when one 
thinks of state governance, Thuringia has had an impact on foreign policy under 
the current administration. In particular, the state has focused on its relationship 
with Israel over the course of the past year, which is part of the Left Party’s 
policy of supporting Israel due to their policy of opposition to the Nazi 
government. Ramelow, along with other members of the government, travelled 
to Israel. This trip was important symbolically as Ramelow’s first foreign trip in 
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office, as well as practically important because the trip was the final step in an 
effort to start more exchange programs between the University of Erfurt as well 
as Albert Schweitzer Gymnasium and Israeli institutions in Haifa.186 As a 
member of the Left Party, this trip is especially important because it shows that 
the Left Party is balancing their practical approach to governance with gestures 
that are based on party ideology. Although the party’s ideology is built upon 
condemnation of the Holocaust, others say that the party’s views toward the 
Israel-Palestine dispute border on antisemitism.187 
 The program was also meant to spur economic cooperation between 
Thuringia and Israel. The state of Thuringia is looking to grow its economy 
overall due to the availability of industrial lands left vacant since German 
reunification as well as the Thuringian capital of Erfurt’s location on a new train 
line between Berlin and Munich. The Israeli economy’s focus on electronic and 
optical technology is also similar to the Thuringian economic focus.188 However, 
this trip was not completely a Left Party idea; the mechanics behind the 
university and school exchange programs were already underway before the 
Left Party took power. 
 The state’s foreign policy has also included interactions with both China 
and the Holy See. A state economic delegation was sent to Guangdong in 
September 2015 in order to attend a conference on Chinese-German 
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relations.189 The Laser World of Photonics exhibition in China in March 2016 
was listed as one of the major events in Thuringian trade this year.190 In 
February 2016, Bodo Ramelow and a delegation from Thuringia were granted a 
private audience with Pope Francis, although the state’s hopes that Pope 
Francis would visit Thuringia as part of Reformation Jubilee Year in 2017 were 
quickly dashed.191 Both of these foreign policy actions have been criticized, the 
first from the Left Party itself and the second by those in the opposition, 
because the Left Party is historically against religion and in favor of better 
relations with communist states over free Western societies. Despite these 
criticisms, both of these policies are continuations of previous policy even 
though they were carried out under the current government, showing the ability 
of the left-wing coalition to work under conditions that others had already set up 
while putting their own politics into play. Therefore, they do not represent a 
serious departure from the CDU’s foreign policy while in office in Thuringia. In 
particular, the steps the left-wing coalition has made towards working with 
diverse religious groups shows that is willing to embrace diversity not only as a 
campaign promise, but as actual policy. 
Social Policy 
 The social policies of the current government have been underwhelming 
in comparison to election promises, which falls in line with political theory. 
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Political parties are expected to campaign on a more extreme platform than 
they actually rule with in order to differentiate themselves from other parties.192 
Part of this is due to the first hundred days in office being spent as an 
organizational time by the R2G coalition. Only the ministers from the SPD had 
experience in state government, so the representatives from the other two 
parties had to adjust to their new roles.193 Part of this new government included 
sticking to the Left Party’s rhetoric about gender equality; the cabinet is divided 
equally between men and women, a first for Thuringia.194 The transition from a 
CDU to Left Party-led government has been widely considered a success as 
the day-to-day operations of the government have been smooth and no 
scandals have developed. 
 The local mayors have had some problems with the state government. 
Andreas Bausewein, the mayor of Erfurt, said communication surrounding the 
municipal economic packages was not going well.195 Other mayors, especially 
those in rural areas, have highly criticized the government for not adhering to its 
campaign promises, in which they promised to undo the €242 million cuts in the 
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municipal budgets.196 The funding of private schools is another area where the 
government has only partly lived up to its promises. The state allocated more 
money to private schools, but the increase in the number of students attending 
these schools means that the government is actually contributing a smaller 
percentage of private school funding than before.197 
 These issues of social policy show that the left-wing government is 
attempting to prove itself as a social-minded coalition that is effective and true 
to its word, but this has not been totally successful in practice, which could 
serve as a hindrance to this coalition as others look to it as a model for future 
alliances. 
Refugee Crisis 
 As in the rest of Germany, the refugee crisis has been a major issue in 
Thuringia over the course of the past year. Although Thuringia was criticized for 
taking in a lower percentage of refugees than other states at first, the 
government was highly supportive of refugees once they began to arrive. 
Ramelow in particular jumped on the issue by personally welcoming the first 
batch of refugees to Thuringia, calling it “a great day for Thuringia and a great 
day for Germany,” while the CDU was waiting to form their opinion based on the 
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views of most Germans.198 This delay in action may have damaged the CDU’s 
standing in Germany and was highly criticized in the press. Although the 
refugee crisis has since become less popular to the public at large, the Left 
Party in Thuringia, as in the rest of Germany, continues to stand by its policy of 
accepting refugees as part of their social program. 
 The crisis has also been met with demands for more federal funds for 
refugees by the Thuringian government.199 These demands were made in April 
2015, at which point in time the highest estimates for incoming refugees 
nationwide was 300,000.200 The number turned out to be over 800,000. Despite 
this, the Left Party in Thuringia still stands by its decision to support refugee 
resettlement, and has requested more refugees in order to fill vacant jobs in the 
state.  
Bundesrat 
 The Bundesrat, Germany’s federal council, is composed of 
representatives from each of the state governments. This means that the Left 
Party is enjoying a new level of representation in the Bundesrat, although the 
impact is diminished because the number of votes in this council is determined 
by population, and Thuringia is one of the smallest federal states. The only 
other state with Left Party representation in this body is Brandenburg.201  
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 Although the Bundesrat is less well-known than the Bundestag, this body 
still has legislative powers and can check the other federal bodies, especially on 
issues concerning state interests.202 Recently, the issue of a change in law 
concerning refugees caused a rift in the Thuringian delegation. The Left and 
Greens were against the measure that would prevent refugees in Albania, 
Kosovo, and Montenegro from gaining asylum in Germany, but the SPD was in 
favor of the measure. In the end, the delegation abstained from the vote, which 
successfully passed.203 This demonstrates that although the members of the 
coalition may disagree on some issues, a left-wing coalition can come to a 
reasonable alternative that everyone can agree on. 
 Another measure the Thuringian delegation to the Bundesrat has 
promoted is increased WiFi for public spaces.204 Additionally, the delegation is 
moving to change the legislation which makes WiFi network operators 
responsible for the actions of their users, including illegal downloads and 
criminal activity. This is related to another Bundesrat issue that Thuringia 
campaigned against: the compulsory retention of user data by 
telecommunications companies.205 These actions represent the new Left Party 
and its motivations to distance itself from Stasi surveillance-like measures, as 
well as trying to engage with students and other young voters who have come 
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to regard internet access as a right. Within the Bundesrat, the Left Party and its 
coalition partners have acted as a perfectly respectable political faction. 
 The formation of Germany’s first Left Party-led state government was a 
controversial issue across Germany. However, the coalition’s actions while in 
office so far do not represent a dramatic departure from the CDU’s policies 
while in office in Thuringia. The Left Party has not attempted to re-establish the 
German Democratic Republic inside Thuringia, as some in the CDU suggested 
following the September 2014 election.206 The red-red-green government has 
instead focused on moderately leftist policies during its first year in office. This 
approach to a left-wing coalition could, therefore, serve as a model to German 
voters as well as political party members who were previously concerned about 
sharing power with the Left Party. 
Significance of R2G 
As coalition talks concluded, criticism of the coalition came all the way 
from Chancellor Merkel; she berated the SPD for forming a coalition with the 
Left Party.207 Multiple members of the CDU, especially from the state party in 
Thuringia, termed this coalition to be a disaster that would result in another 
German Democratic Republic, complete with the surveillance state and 
shortages of consumer goods. The late night talk show scene in Germany was 
not so apprehensive; one comedian said that the risks of such a coalition were 
suited to Thuringia because “80% of the state is a forest, and the rest is just 
trees,” a dig at Thuringia’s status as a rural state that is mostly covered with a 
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protected forest.208 The criticism of R2G from the CDU is at least partly a result 
of worry about their loss of power in Thuringia. The belief, stated in Der Spiegel 
as the R2G government took office, that a red-red-green coalition on the federal 
level could take the CDU out of national power is another reason why the CDU 
reacted so strongly to this coalition.209 
The Thuringian R2G experiment has been seen by some as proof that 
Germany can be governed without the CDU, with sources from Der Spiegel to 
the state news broadcaster calling it a possible model for the country.210 Some 
say this could be the SPD and Greens’s ticket to knocking Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and the CDU out of the national governing slot in 2017. This may prove 
important as Euroskeptic and right wing parties such as AfD continue to 
influence German politics and thus pull the CDU’s politics further to the right, 
which could clear the way for the SPD to become the most moderate party.211 
Wider Impact of Thuringian Government 
 The wider impact that the Left Party’s place in the Thuringian 
government has on German politics should not be overstated. This coalition 
would be of greater note if it had not happened in a former East German state. 
Enduring perceptions of differences between those who grew up in East and 
West Germany extend to politics as well. West Germans have little to no 
nostalgic sentiment towards the Left Party, which causes some to view Left 
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Party supporters with disdain because they are considered to be deluded in 
voting for a former dictatorship.212 However, the Left Party is working to leave 
its past behind and be received as a responsible, legitimate party by both the 
media and the German people. 
 At the same time, the cries that the Left Party’s place in office would 
bring back a return of the German Democratic Republic were greatly 
exaggerated. The Left Party’s government has so far acted in a way that is 
more business as usual than implementing extreme policies. The day-to-day 
governance is so normal that the uproar over this government has for the most 
part died down in other German states. Overall, the impact of this government 
seems to be the way that the Left Party has normalized itself as a governing 
party; now that it is out of the opposition in Thuringia, it has changed some of its 
policies in that state because criticism is much easier than action. As a result, it 
has shown itself to be a normal party that operates on the left side of the 
political spectrum.  
Left Party vs. AfD 
 On a basic level, the Left Party and AfD share some defining qualities. 
Both parties are small, populist organizations. They both are against further 
integration with the West and favor a turn to Russia.213 Both also wish to 
change a fundamental part of German society and appeal to those who feel 
betrayed by the mainstream party system. These parties are also experiencing 
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historically high levels of popularity, given the AfD’s poll numbers and the Left 
Party’s power in Thuringia.214 Both parties may benefit from the chaos afflicting 
the major mainstream parties on the federal level and suffer from taboos 
surrounding their place in government. The disruptive nature of these parties in 
contemporary politics is their most important quality. However, the Left Party 
and the AfD are very different parties with different priorities. 
 The Left Party and the AfD disagree on most major issues; the Left Party 
is pro-refugee, while the AfD is against letting non-ethnic Germans into the 
country.215 The AfD’s views on many issues, including taxation and abortion, 
are close to those of other right-wing parties like the Republicans in the United 
States.216 The Left Party, on the other hand, espouses a strong social program 
for Germany with increased taxation to fund welfare programs, schools, 
retirement, and daycare.217 In fact, the Left Party’s website contains an anti-AfD 
portion explaining how that party is hindering the Left’s anti-right-wing 
program.218 The AfD is also very patriotic, a quality that the Left Party does not 
share, in part due to its past as a member of the Soviet bloc, where allegiance 
to the group of communist states was more important than German nationalism. 
219 The Left Party and the AfD may share similar qualities including their appeal 
to those who feel estranged from their own society, but when it comes to policy, 
the two parties are substantially different. 
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Conclusion 
Although the Left Party did not win the most votes in the Thuringian state 
elections in 2014, the party was nonetheless successful in creating a coalition 
government. However, the Left Party’s voters were overwhelmingly older than 
those that voted for the CDU, which could spell trouble for the coalition in the 
next election. The Left Party’s leading role in this coalition was caused by a 
perfect storm of voter turnout, the split right-wing vote, and the fall of the FDP. 
The Left Party’s past as the East German ruling party has affected its ideology, 
but the party’s authoritarian elements have been purged in the twenty-five years 
since German reunification. Despite this, the party still meets considerable 
difficulties in participating in governing coalitions due to its reluctance to 
denounce all the unsavory elements of its past. 
The idea of Thuringia as a model for a federal coalition has its limits. The 
makeup of Thuringia is different from that of other states; additionally, the Left 
Party is still much less popular in western Germany than it is in the new federal 
states. The staying power of this coalition will not be tested until the next 
election cycle in 2019, so the possibility remains that the Left Party could be 
thrown out on its ear at that time.  
Although the Left Party and the AfD draw comparisons due to their 
populist roots and outsider status, the two parties are politically quite different. 
The Left Party is focused on social issues, while the AfD is more focused on the 
Euro and the refugee crisis. Nationalism and patriotism are handled differently 
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by the two parties, even though they both appeal to those who are outsiders in 
society. 
 Despite worries from those on the right as well as some within the SPD 
and Greens, the coalition has so far functioned as a normal ruling coalition. 
Social and foreign policy, as well as Bundesrat legislation, have not greatly 
deviated from previous government policies. This falls in line with the idea that 
critiques from parties out of power are easily able to be radical, but actual policy 
is constrained by compromise.220 This proves that the Left Party could be adept 
at ruling on a higher level as well; the party is no longer exclusively a regional 
party, but a party with the ability to cooperate, compromise, and govern. 
However, the overall negative image that the party has in western Germany 
mean that this party is unlikely to be a major player on the national level, no 
matter how well it governs in Thuringia; no matter how weak the CDU may 
seem, it remains doubtful that disillusioned CDU voters would turn to the Left 
Party as an alternative while parties such as the SPD, AfD, and FDP exist. 
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Conclusion 
 Although Angela Merkel’s CDU has suffered a loss of popularity in recent 
months, the situation in Germany is still not favorable for a broad left-wing 
coalition on the federal level. Data from previous elections show that the CDU is 
popular across demographics and fails to show an impending demographic shift 
due to age or education, even with the rise of the AfD. The case study from 
Thuringia shows that the Left Party is slowly building trust and is able to govern 
competently, but the taboo against working with that party still exists to some 
extent within the SPD and CDU. Instead, the greater impact of the red-red-
green coalition in Thuringia may be the trust that the Left Party is building due 
to its responsible governance. Most importantly, although the press in Germany 
and abroad continue to speak of the impending end of the European Union and 
the danger that Merkel and her party are currently facing, they often ignore the 
state of affairs among political parties: the SPD has suffered blows to its 
credibility through its welfare reforms in the early 2000s and since then has not 
sufficiently set itself apart from a CDU that has been slightly left of center.221 
 The CDU and the CSU may face setbacks in the near future, especially 
as the CSU’s majority rule in Bavaria looks to be threatened by the AfD, but 
their setbacks would have to be accompanied by an alliance on the left before 
they destroyed the party’s place at the top of German politics. The long history 
of CDU/CSU conflicts shows us that although these two parties may argue from 
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time to time, they ultimately work together in order to preserve the CSU’s 
dominance in Bavarian politics. 
 The red-red-green coalition in Thuringia is a great opportunity for the Left 
Party to demonstrate its reforms and distance itself from its East German past. 
This coalition may be another in a series of poor decisions for the SPD, since 
many who voted for this party felt betrayed by its decision to join a Left Party 
coalition in Thuringia. However, the Left Party throughout Germany may reap 
the benefits of this coalition, which shows that the Left Party can govern fairly in 
a democratic society. 
 Germany’s next federal elections are a year away. Political issues that 
are of great importance now may decline in popularity; a fickle electorate may 
have its voting decision swayed by immediate concerns. The SPD and Greens 
have reacted to the CDU’s current reign of power by concentrating their efforts 
on the state levels, where they and the Left Party have been much more 
successful in gaining power than on the national level. All three left-wing parties 
are currently suffering from a lack of federal popularity. However, many in 
Germany are unsatisfied with Merkel’s approach to the refugee crisis, which 
opens the door to a left-wing coalition.  
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Appendix 1: Abbreviations 
 
Alliance90/the Greens – the Greens 
Alternative for Germany – AfD 
Electoral Alternative for Labor and Justice - WASG 
European Union – EU 
Freedom Party of Austria - FPÖ 
Free Democratic Party - FDP 
German Christian Democratic Union - CDU 
German Christian Social Union – CSU 
German Communist Party - KPD 
German National Democratic Party - NPD 
German Social Democratic Party – SPD 
German Social Unity Party – SED 
German Socialist Student Organization - SDS 
Left Party/SPD/Green Coalition – R2G 
Party of Democratic Socialism – PDS 
Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West - Pegida 
South Schleswig Voters' Association - SSW 
